

EKSEMPLER PÅ AFSKRIFT I *HJERTET BLØDER* AF NASER KHADER

Bogen *Hjertet bløder* (2015) er skrevet af Naser Khader i samarbejde med journalisten Stig Matthiesen og er udgivet på forlaget People'sPress. I bogen er der en lang række påfaldende sproglige sammenfald med især engelsksprogede bøger, artikler og opslagsværker, som på intet tidspunkt nævnes i bogen. Herunder følger et samlet overblik – markeringer med gul angiver eksempler på plagiat.

Indholdsfortegnelse

“ARABERNE LIGNER DERES HESTE”, S. 27-29	2
“ARABISK BRØDKULTUR”, S. 44-47	3
“JØDERNES TRÆNGSLER”, S. 63-68	5
“ALAWITTERNES VEJ TIL MAGTEN”, S. 70-73	8
“KLANEN ASSAD”, S. 74-78	10
“ARABISK ASYL”, S. 118-121	12
“PAN-ISLAMISME”, S. 122-123	15
“KAMPEN OM ISLAM”, S. 161-171	17
“KALIFFEN AF ISLAMISK STAT”, S. 206-210	23
“LIBYENS KOLLAPS”, S. 210-213	27
“REKRUTTERING TIL ISLAMISK STAT”, S. 219-224	28
SAMLET LITTERATUROVERSIGT	32

“ARABERNE LIGNER DERES HESTE”, S. 27-29

Sammenlignet med:

Wikipedia: “Arabian horse”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabian_horse

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 270 ud af 561 ord = ca. 48 pct. af kapitlet

“Op gennem historien er araberheste blevet spredt over hele verden, som gaver, gennem krig og i handel. De er blevet brugt til at forbedre andre racer for at tilføre dem hastighed, udholdenhed og stærke ben. I dag findes de arabiske blodlinjer i næsten alle de moderne hesteracer. Araberen blev oprindeligt udviklet i ørkenklimaet og var meget værdsat af de beduinske nomader. Den blev ofte taget med ind i familiens telt for at give den ly og beskytte den mod tyveri. Man foretog selektiv avl for at fremelske særlige karaktertræk, herunder evnen til et godt samarbejde med mennesker. Man skabte en hesterace, som er hurtig til at lære og villig til at behage. Araberen udviklede også en årvågenhed, som er nødvendig for en hest, som anvendes både til at ride på og til krigsførelse.”

(Khader 2015: 28-29)

“Throughout history, Arabian horses have spread around the world by both war and trade, used to improve other breeds by adding speed, refinement, endurance, and strong bone. Today, Arabian bloodlines are found in almost every modern breed of riding horse. The Arabian developed in a desert climate and was prized by the nomadic Bedouin people, often being brought inside the family tent for shelter and protection from theft. Selective breeding for traits including an ability to form a cooperative relationship with humans created a horse breed that is good-natured, quick to learn, and willing to please. The Arabian also developed the high spirit and alertness needed in a horse used for raiding and war.”

(Wikipedia)

“Araberhesten kan kendes på sit raffinerede, kileformede hoved, den brede pande, de store øjne og næsebor og den lille mule. Den har også en lille bule i panden mellem øjnene, som beduinerne kalder jibbah. Et andet racekendetegn er hovedets forening med halsen – af beduinerne kaldet mitbah eller mitbeh. På araberhesten forløber stykket i en smuk bue uden knæk og er på de bedste arabere langt og fleksibelt og giver god plads til luftrøret og dermed vejrtrækning. Nogle arabere er brede med et muskuløs bagparti, egnet til intense kraftudfoldelser, mens andre har længere, slankere muskler, som er bedre egnet til distanceridning eller hestevæddeløb på lange, flade strækninger. Overordnet set har de fleste arabere dog en kompakt krop, tætte og stærke knogler med en kort ryg og korte ben – ligesom araber-mennesket. Racestandarden beskriver arabereren som

“Arabian horses have refined, wedge-shaped heads, a broad forehead, large eyes, large nostrils, and small muzzles. Most display a distinctive concave, or "dished" profile. Many Arabians also have a slight forehead bulge between their eyes, called the *jibbah* by the Bedouin, that adds additional sinus capacity, believed to have helped the Arabian horse in its native dry desert climate.^{[1][2]} Another breed characteristic is an arched neck with a large, well-set windpipe set on a refined, clean throatlatch. This structure of the poll and throatlatch was called the *mitbah* or *mitbeh* by the Bedouin. In the ideal Arabian it is long, allowing flexibility in the bridle and room for the windpipe.^[2] [...] Some individuals have wider, more powerfully muscled hindquarters suitable for intense bursts of activity in events such as reining, while others have longer, leaner muscling better

145-155 cm høj. Men uanset højden er alle arabere klassificeret som »heste«, selv om 147 cm er den officielle skillelinje mellem hest og en pony.”

(Khader 2015: 29)

suited for long stretches of flat work such as endurance riding or horse racing.^[5] Most have a compact body with a short back.^[2] Arabians usually have dense, strong bone, and good hoof walls. [...] The breed standard stated by the United States Equestrian Federation, describes Arabians as standing between 14.1 to 15.1 hands (57 to 61 inches, 145 to 155 cm) tall, "with the occasional individual over or under."^[3] Thus, all Arabians, regardless of height, are classified as "horses", even though 14.2 hands (58 inches, 147 cm) is the traditional cutoff height between a horse and a pony.”

(Wikipedia)

“ARABISK BRØDKULTUR”, S. 44-47

Sammenlignet med:

- 1) Habeeb Salloum (2012): “Middle Eastern Breads”. *Backwoods Home Magazine*, <http://www.backwoodshome.com/middle-eastern-breads/>
- og 2) Vijay Prashad (2012): *Arab Spring, Libyan Winter*. Oakland: AK Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 480 ud af 725 ord = ca. 66 pct. af kapitlet

“Araberne spiser brød til hvert eneste måltid – også til dessert. Araberne hævder ligefrem, at maden slet ikke smager godt spist med bestik, men kun med brød, som bruges som en slags bestik. Både i traditionen og i det daglige liv anses brød for at være en guddommelig gave fra Gud. Egypterne kalder brød aysh – som betyder »livet selv«. Hvis et stykke brød falder på gulvet i den arabiske verden, vil en person samle det op, kysse det og spise det. Jeg så det ske i min barndoms Syrien, når min mormor tabte et stykke brød på gulvet og ikke tillod, at det blev smidt ud sammen med affaldet. Spanierne overtog denne sædvane fra araberne under deres lange ophold på Den Iberiske Halvø. Når et stykke brød falder på gulvet i Spanien, vil de efter arabisk skik sige: Es pan de Dios. Spanierne har i øvrigt overtaget mange arabiske udtryk. Det opdager man, når man besøger Andalusien med de mange arabiske bynavne. Der er også fodboldfansenes råb, olé, olé, olé, som kommer af det arabiske ord Allah, det vil sige gud. Men det bør man nok ikke fortælle fodbold-hooligans. Altså at

“Arabs, the majority people in the Middle East, eat bread with every meal. In tradition and in daily life, bread is held to be a divine gift from God. The Egyptians call bread ‘aysh which means “life itself.” In the Arab world, if a piece of bread falls on the floor, a person will pick it up and kiss it, then eat it. I used to see this happen at home when my mother dropped a piece of bread on the floor, not allowing it to be thrown away with the garbage. [...] The Spanish picked up this habit from the Arabs during their long stay in the Iberian Peninsula. In Spain, when a piece of bread falls on the floor, in the Arab fashion they will say: “Es pan de Dios” (in Arabic, ‘aysh Allah means God’s bread). The Arabs claim that they cannot taste other foods without bread and the bread types they have to choose from are numerous and varied. Arab bread comes in many textures, sizes, and shapes. Without question, the mother of all these Middle Eastern breads is pita – by far, the most popularly found in the Middle East. Called Khubz Arabee among the Arabs in that part of the world and once called flatbread or Syrian bread in

de faktisk råber »Allah, Allah, Allah«, når de er på stadion. Arabisk brød kommer i mange størrelser og former. Moderbrødet er uden tvivl pitaen – langt det mest populære i Mellemøsten. Det bliver kaldt khubz arabi i den arabiske verden. I USA hed det tidligere fladbrød eller syrisk brød. I dag er det blot bredt kendt som pitabrød – som er et græsk navn. Pitabrød er normalt blødt og bøjeligt, som alle typer af mellemøstligt brød er det – perfekt til den arabiske måde at spise på. En af de største fordele ved denne type brød er, at man kan tage pitabrødet og dyppe det i olivenolie, forskellige yoghurt-spreads, hummus eller tahini – der er ikke brug for kniv eller ske. Pitabrød kan også bruges som en slags skovl til at samle kød, grønsager og salater og til saucer og dip. Når pitabrødet er skåret over i to, skilles toppen og bunden af brødet let, og det halve brød former en lomme, som kan fyldes med varm falafel, shawarma, kufta, der er en arabisk version af hamburgeren, eller salat. I hånden sidder man med en lækker sandwich.”

(Khader 2015: 44-45)

the United States – that is before Syria became the “bad boy” of the Middle East – it is now widely known as pita bread – a Greek name. Pita bread, like all types of Middle Eastern breads, is usually soft and pliable – perfect for the Arab way of eating. One of the greatest advantages of this type of bread means that you can take pita bread and dip it in olive oil, yogurt spreads, hummus, and tahini – no need for a knife or a spoon.

Pita bread is used for picking up meat, vegetables, and salads and serves as a scoop for sauces, dips, yogurt, and other semi-liquids. When the loaf is cut into two, the top and bottom of the loaf separate easily and the halves form pockets which can be filled with hot falafel, shawarma (barbecued meats), kufta (Arab version of hamburgers), and/or salads to make delicious sandwiches.”

(Salloum 2012)

“Med den tradition kan man godt undre sig over, at de arabiske magthavere ikke forudså folkets vrede, da Den Internationale Valutafonds madprisindeks i de sidste to kvartaler af 2010 steg med 30 procent, og kornpriserne med 60 procent. Demonstranter i Tunesien gik på gaden i december med flutes hævet i vejret. I Egypten gik folket på gaden i januar og råbte taktfast: »De spiser duer og kylling, og vi spiser hestebønner.« Sult og ulighed drev demonstranterne. Deres regeringer fremskyndede tilskuddene til brød, men da var det for sent. Nasser, Egyptens præsident i 1950'erne og 60'erne, kendte mekanismerne og forstod vigtigheden af brødtilskud, hvorfor han sørgede for at fremme den hjemlige produktion af hvede. Men da Sadat kom til magten i 1970, skar han gradvist i disse tilskud og underminerede dermed sin kontrakt med folket – det, som den tunesiske intellektuelle Larbi Sadiki har kaldt for *dimuqratiya al-khubz*, et »demokrati af brød«. Hosni Mubarak, der blev indsat i 1981 efter mordet på Sadat, overtog forgængerens politikker og også hans

“In the last two quarters of 2010, the IMF Food Price Index rose by thirty percent. Grain prices soared by sixty percent. Protestors in Tunisia came into the streets in December with baguettes raised in the air. In Egypt, protestors took to the streets in January chanting, “They are eating pigeon and chicken, and we are eating beans all the time.” Hunger and inequality drove the protests. Their governments hastened to up their subsidies, but it was too little, too late. The question of bread reveals a great deal about the delinquent states in Egypt and Tunisia. The Nasserite state in Egypt well understood the importance of a bread subsidy, and it encouraged the domestic production of wheat for the bread needs of the citizenry. When Anwar Sadat came to power in the 1970s, he gradually cut off the bread subsidy, what the Tunisian intellectual Larbi Sadiki calls a “democracy of bread” (*dimuqratiyyat al-khubz*).”

(Prashad 2012: 9-10)

“The contradictions of the neoliberal security state in Egypt were plainly exhausted by 2008, when the “bread

forsømmelighed over for folkets krav om brød. I tiden op til Muhammed-krisen i 2006 steg priserne på brød, og man oplevede demonstrationer i mindre målestok på tværs af den arabiske verden, fra Marokko til Syrien. Køerne for at få brød bare voksede og voksede, uden at Mubarak for alvor tog hånd om sagen. I marts 2008 døde omkring et dusin mennesker i slagsmål eller af udmattelse, mens de ventede på brød, og da egypterne protesterede, svarede Hosni Mubarak igen med at sætte hæren ind for at undertrykke disse »brød-martyrer«. Den 6. april 2008 gik en massedemonstration fra byen El-Mahalla El-Kubra fra at handle om brød til også at omhandle arbejdsløshed og sikkerhedsstaten Egyptens udskejelser.”

(Khader 2015: 46-47)

intifada” returned in force (protests in much smaller scale were seen across the Arab world, from Morocco to Syria). The pressure was such that lines for bread increased, and by March 2008 about a dozen people died in scuffles or from exhaustion, waiting on bread. Hosni Mubarak, the heir to Sadat’s policies, sent in the army to quell protests over these “bread martyrs.” On April 6, 2008, a mass protest in al-Mahalla al-Kubra went from the issue of bread to unemployment and onward to the normal excesses of the security state.”

(Prashad 2012: 12)

“JØDERNES TRÆNGSLER”, S. 63-68

Sammenlignet med:

New Internationalist (2004): “The Longest Hatred”. *New Internationalist*, vol. 372, <https://newint.org/features/2004/10/01/history/>

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“Men fra Alexandria beordrede den romerske guvernør Flaccus i 38 e.Kr. den første pogrom – jødeudrensning. Tusinder af jøder blev tævet, voldtaget og trukket gennem gaderne og brændt på bål. Endnu flere blev fordrevet af romerne i år 70 e.Kr., og jøder har været udsat for antisemitisme lige siden. At Jesus var jøde og blev korsfæstet af romerne, var to store hindringer for spredningen af kristendommen i Romerriget. For at nå det mål var man derfor nødt til at minimere romernes ansvar for Jesu død – og nedtone hans ‘jødiskhed’. Denne historiske revisionisme fremgår af tidlige kristne tekster, der giver Pontius Pilatus og kejser Tiberius ansvaret for Jesu død, hvor senere tekster giver jøderne skylden, mens romerne fremstilles i et mere sympatisk lys. Den kristne kirke udviklede et stort had mod alt jødisk. Jøder blev fremstillet som dæmoniske, den mørke og forræderiske apostel var Judas, opkaldt efter en af de

“The ‘first pogrom’ in Alexandria in 38 AD was ordered by Roman governor Flaccus. Thousands of Jews were beaten, raped, and paraded through the streets to be burned on bonfires. [...] That Jesus was Jewish and crucified by the Romans were two major stumbling blocks to the spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire. Many scholars believe that the Gospels were written with the desire to reach out to the Roman emperors in order to preserve the religion and ensure its longevity. To achieve this, the responsibility of the Romans for Jesus’ death needed to be minimized and his ‘Jewishness’ downplayed. This historical revisionism is evidenced by early Christian texts attributing blame to Pontius Pilate and Emperor Tiberius whereas later texts refer to ‘the Jews’ and also paint the Romans in a more sympathetic light. [...] The Church soon developed a symbolic opposition to all things Jewish. Jews were held up as the demonic other, the ‘black and treacherous

<p>israelske stamfædre, og i kirken talte man om "Satans Synagoge". I år 534 degraderede kejser Justinian i sin version af romerretten (<i>Corpus Juris Civilis</i>) jøderne til andenrangsborgere. Forsøg på at opføre synagoger ville for eksempel blive straffet med døden og tab af al ejendom. Toledo-synoderne fra det syvende århundredes Spanien tvang jødiske børn til at bo hos kristne familier, fra de fyldte syv år. Først i 1965 frafaldt den katolske kirke anklagen om, at jøderne var ansvarlige for Jesu død gennem et sæt reformer kendt som 2. Vatikankoncil. Mange kristne fundamentalister – også kristne i den arabiske verden – afviste dog disse reformer. Det er synspunkter som deres, man senest har kunnet opleve populariseret i Mel Gibsons film fra 2004 <i>The Passion of the Christ</i>."</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 64-65)</p>	<p>Judas', and the 'synagogue of Satan'. Christian theologians and emperors would wax poetic in their demonization of the Jews, and churches would be adorned with 'sacred art' depicting the righteous denigration of Judaism. By 534, the Justinian Code would degrade Jews to second-class citizens. Attempting to build a synagogue would be punished by death and forfeiture of all assets. The Toledo Synods of seventh-century Spain forced Jewish children to live with Christian families after the age of seven. [...] In 1965 the Catholic Church finally repudiated the charge that the Jews were responsible for the death of Christ through a set of reforms known as Vatican II. Many Christian fundamentalists, however, rejected these reforms and their views have been most recently popularized by Mel Gibson's <i>The Passion of the Christ</i>."</p> <p>(New Internationalist 2004)</p>
<p>"Muhammed betragtede oprindeligt jøderne som potentielle allierede. Men islams møde med jøderne er også en anelse ambivalent. Profeten lod for eksempel alle jødiske mænd fra en bestemt stamme i Medina dræbe og tog deres kvinder og børn som slaver – dog ikke kun fordi de var jøder, for han var samtidig i alliance med andre jødiske stammer. Det handlede mest om politiske uoverensstemmelser. Muhammed betragtede jøderne som et 'bogens folk', hvilket betød, at de blev accepteret på linje med de kristne og fik lov til at dyrke deres religion. Dermed fik jøder i de islamiserede områder generelt en bedre behandling end den, de oplevede i den kristne del af verden. Det betød dog ikke den rene fryd og gammen, for islam havde overtaget dele af den oprindelige kristne antisemitisme. Også den islamiske verden behandlede i perioder jøderne som andenrangsborgere. De blev henvist til at bo i bestemte områder og skulle gå i bestemt tøj, så de let kunne skelnes fra ikke-jøder. Djævle og aber udskåret i træ blev sømmet fast til jødernes hjem, og deres bedesteder blev ødelagt under kalif al-Mutawakkils styre fra 850. Især påbuddet om at jøder skulle gå med et gult tegn, har sørgelige associationer til nazitiden."</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 65-66)</p>	<p>"Muhammad originally viewed the Jews as potential allies. However, when the Jews of Medina refused to convert to Islam, he had all the Jewish men of the city slaughtered and the women and children taken as slaves. Despite this, as Islam spread, Jews were accepted as 'people of the book' (<i>dhimmi</i>) along with Christians and were generally accorded better treatment than in Christian societies. However, they were usually forced to live in separate areas (<i>mellah</i>), and were made to wear certain garbs so that they could be easily identifiable. In 807 Caliph Harun al-Rashid ordered all Jews to wear yellow badges. Wooden devils and apes were nailed on the homes of Jews and their places of worship were destroyed under the reign of Caliph al-Mutawakkil from 850."</p> <p>(New Internationalist 2004)</p>

“Den senere periode af det muslimske styre i middelalderens Spanien, maurernes al-Andalus, ses som en guldalder for jødedommen. Her var forfølgelser meget sjældne, og den jødiske kultur blomstrede sammen med den muslimske. Man kan ikke ligefrem tale om et paradys på jord, men der herskede dog en vis respekt mellem de forskellige religioner. Europæiske korsfarere myrdede i den samme periode – for at ‘befri’ Jerusalem – tusindvis af jøder, arabiske kristne og muslimer. Kirken tvang de resterende jøder til at bære særpræget tøj – gule mærker i Frankrig, spidse hatte i Tyskland. De hebraiske skrifter blev af skiftende paver beordret ødelagt ved store, offentlige bogafbrændinger på byernes lokale torve op igennem hele Europa. Såkaldt blod-anklager om rituelle jødiske mord på kristne børn dukkede også op som en del af dæmoniseringen af jøderne, for eksempel i 1144 i England, som til sidst uddrev jøderne. Den berømteste blod-anklage involverede påstanden om et rituelt mord i 1475 begået af jøder mod en lille italiensk dreng, Simonino fra Trento, som senere blev ophøjet til helgen og var en del af den officielle katolske kirkekalender helt frem til 1965. Inkvisitionen skabte siden begrebet “blodrenhed” – enhver med 1/8 jødisk blod blev anset for uren, selv hvis vedkommende havde konverteret til kristendommen.”

(Khader 2015: 66)

“ I Frankrig havde den ligeledes forfuskede Dreyfus-affære mod en fransk-jødisk militærkaptajn i 1894 vist den dybe antisemitiske understrøm i det franske samfund. Og i USA begyndte Henry Ford, grundlæggeren af Ford-bilfabrikkerne, sin livslange kamp imod “den internationale jøde”, der blev set som den menneskelige gestaltning af “socialismens onder”. Parallelt voksende den nationale socialisme i Tyskland med et program om antisemitisme som en politisk bevægelse til at udrydde “kapitalismens og den internationale finansverdens onder”. Nazisternes umenneskeliggørelse af jøderne byggede på årtusinders myter og stereotyper og banede vejen for masseudryddelsesprogrammet *Endlösung*.

“The later period of Moorish Spain (*al-Andalus*), however, is seen as one of the golden ages of Judaism where persecution was rare and Jewish culture flourished. [...] European crusaders *en route* to ‘liberate’ Jerusalem from Islam, murdered thousands of Jews at the close of the 11th century. The Church forced the remaining Jews to wear distinctive clothing (yellow badges in France, pointy hats in Germany) in order to discourage relations with Christians. Hebrew scriptures were ordered by the Popes to be destroyed in large public book-burning gatherings in local town squares throughout Europe. Passion plays were used to reinforce Jewish responsibility for the death of Christ and other anti-Jewish transmissions and were often followed by pogroms. ‘Blood libel’ surfaced as part of the demonology of ‘the Jew’, appearing first in 1144 England where Jews would be eventually expelled after a series of pogroms. The most famous blood libel accusation involved the allegation of a ritual murder of a young boy in Italy, Simon, in 1475 who was later made a saint (the official Catholic Church account lasted until 1950). The Inquisition established the notion of blood purity – anyone with an eighth Jewish blood was considered to be impure even if they had converted to Christianity.”

(New Internationalist 2004)

“In France, the infamous Dreyfus Affair of 1894, where a French Jewish army captain was falsely charged with passing military information to Germany, exposed deep antisemitic undercurrents in French society. [...] Henry Ford began his lifelong fight against the ‘International Jew’ who was seen as the human embodiment of the ‘evils of socialism’. In parallel National Socialism in Germany rose on a programme of antisemitism as a political movement to eradicate the ‘evils of capitalism and international finance’. [...] The Nazis built on millennia of myths and stereotypes to dehumanize utterly the Jews in the public mind, paving the way for the *endlösung* (final solution). [...] Mass emigration to Palestine, the biblical homeland, became an

Emigration til Palæstina og drømmen om et land der beskyttede jøderne, blev en vej ud for de heldige. Staten Israel blev oprettet 14. maj 1948. Mange jøder i muslimske lande blev herefter mål for politisk modstand imod den israelske stat, hvilket førte til jødeforfølgelser i Libyen, Syrien, Egypten, Yemen og Irak og udmøntede sig i mere emigration til Israel. Seksdageskrigen i 1967 – og besættelsen af Gaza, Vestbredden, Østjerusalem og Golanhøjderne som resultatet heraf – førte til en eksplosion af antisemitisme i den arabiske verden og udbredt sympati for palæstinensernes sag. I den arabiske verden blev jøder nu i stigende grad anset for at være undertrykkerne i stedet for ofre.”

(Khader 2015: 66-67)

imperative for many who dreamed of a Jewish state to protect them from the scourge of antisemitism. [...] The State of Israel was born. Many Jews in Muslim countries were now targeted by political movements opposed to the Jewish state, leading to massive pogroms in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Iraq and eventually mass emigration to Israel. [...] After the Six Day War in 1967, which led to the occupation of the West Bank, Sinai, Gaza and the Golan Heights, a significant segment of the Left abandoned its support for Israel. [...] The Six Day War and resultant occupation led to an explosion of antisemitism in the Arab World and general sympathy towards the plight of the Palestinians. By association with the state of Israel, the ‘Jewish state’, Jews were now increasingly being seen as oppressors instead of victims.”

(New Internationalist 2004)

“ALAWITTERNES VEJ TIL MAGTEN”, S. 70-73

Sammenlignet med:

Christian Sahner (2014): *Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present*. Oxford University Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 570 ud af 968 ord = ca. 59 pct. af kapitlet

“I århundrede levede alawitterne som underklasse i det syriske samfund. I et land, der ellers er fyldt med religiøse dissidenter, var ingen mere foragtede end dem. Alawitterne blev betragtet som nogle sølle udøvere af en sekterisk tro, der byggede på brokker fra både islam, kristendom og gnosticisme. Alawitterne bekender sig til profeten Muhammeds fætter, Ali, hvoraf navnet alawi kommer – det betyder følgere af Ali. Trosretningen har dermed samme grundlæggende overbevisning som shiitterne i den muslimske arvefølgestrid, hvorfor alawitterne betragtes som en gren af shia-islam – men dog ikke som rigtige shiitter, da de ikke følger Koranen og De Fem Søjler. For et undertrykt folk af bønder og krigere var etableringen af en lille, halvautonom alawi-stat i 1920 en velsignelse. Ganske vist havde alawitterne

“For centuries, the ‘Alawis had subsisted on the margins of Syrian society. In a country filled with religious dissidents, the ‘Alawis were the most despised of them all – impoverished practitioners of a secretive Shi’i sect that sampled from the beliefs of Islam, Christianity, and Gnosticism. In light of this, the foundation of a semi-autonomous ‘Alawi statelet in 1920 was a boon to the community. True, some ‘Alawis had participated in a revolt against the French in 1919, and many ‘Alawis remained tepid toward the French mandatory power after World War I. But as the mandate wore on, enthusiasm for the French only warmed; indeed, by the time of the Druze rebellion in 1925, most ‘Alawis elected to stay on the sidelines, content with the quasi-autonomy they enjoyed under their European masters. In 1936, as part of an agreement with the

deltaget i oprøret mod franskmændene i 1919 – og mange alawitter forblev 'lunkne' over for det franske overherredømme efter 1. Verdenskrig. Men som tiden gik, steg begejstringen for franskmændene, og under drusernes oprør i 1925 valgte de fleste alawitter at se til fra sidelinjen – tilfredse som de var med den grad af selvstyre, de havde fået. Det viste sig at være en fejlkalkulation af magtspillet, for som led i en aftale mellem Frankrig og den syriske nationalistbevægelse overdrog kolonimagten i 1936 overherredømmet over alawi-staten til Damaskus. I protest bad flere betydningsfulde alawitter guvernøren i provinshovedstaden Latakia om etableringen af en permanent alawi-stat. Man frygtede undertrykkelse fra det syriske sunnimuslimske flertal. Som jøderne i Palæstina hævdede alawitterne, at suveræniteten var det eneste, der kunne garantere deres sikkerhed. Men de talte for døve øren. Blandt medlemmerne af alawi-delegationen var faderen til den senere præsident Hafez al-Assad. Selv var Hafez kun en dreng, da alt dette stod på, men for hans generation stod lektien fra kolonitiden lysende klar: Hvis ikke alawitterne kunne opnå selvstyre i deres eget territorium, måtte de tvinge sig selv frem til centralmagten. Gennem deres tyve år lange overherredømme i Syrien havde de franske myndigheder optaget alawitter og andre mindretal, herunder kristne og drusere, som medlemmer af *Troupes spéciales du Levant*, der var militære enheder, som under fransk kommando blev indsat i urolige områder – blandt andet i Nordafrika mod andre arabere. *Troupes spéciales du Levant* var en del af en overordnet fransk del og herskestrategi, der havde til formål at holde det sunnimuslimske flertal i skak. Franskmændene satsede på, at de kunne stække den sunnitiske modstand i kolonien Syrien ved at vinde mindretallenes trokab. Det lykkedes. Franskmændene vævede et landsdækkende netværk med sekteriske regeringsrepræsentanter, som satte deres halvautonomi under franskmændene højere end den fulde uafhængighed under, hvad mange frygtede ville være et truende sunnimuslimsk flertal.”

(Khader 2015: 70-72)

surging Syrian nationalists, France agreed to transfer custody of the 'Alawi state to Damascus. In protest, 'Alawi notables petitioned the governor in Latakia to establish a permanent 'Alawi state for them. As minorities, they argued, they risked subjugation at the hands of Syria's Sunni Muslim majority. Furthermore, like the Jews of Palestine, they argued that the only way to secure their safety was to grant them sovereignty. Unfortunately, their petition fell on deaf ears, and the delegation returned home, resigned to an uncertain future. Among the petitioners was none other than the father of future president Hafez al-Assad. The territory again became autonomous in 1939, but was incorporated into Syria once and for all in 1942. For Hafez al-Assad and his generation, the lessons of French colonialism were simple: if the 'Alawis could not achieve autonomy through the creation of a special canton, they would will themselves to power by becoming the standard-bearers of the Arab mainstream. The French had prepared the way for this. Throughout their twenty-year rule of Syria, the French authorities installed 'Alawis and other minorities, including Christians and Circassians, as members of the *troupes spéciales du Levant* – military units designed for deployment to troubled hot-spots under French control. This was part of a wider strategy of “divide and rule” intended to keep the Sunni Muslim majority in check. Indeed, by winning the loyalty of the 'Alawis and other minorities, the French hoped to weaken any possibility of resistance in their colonial backyard. It was a ruthless but effective strategy. From Mt Lebanon to the 'Alawi heartlands, the French managed to weave an overlapping network of sectarian constituents who prized half-hearted autonomy under the French more than outright independence under what many feared would become a threatening Sunni majority.”

(Sahner 2014: 105-107)

“I 1946 blev Syrien en selvstændig stat og alawitternes område indlemmet. Fra Middelhavet i vest til det nordlige Mesopotamien mod nordøst og til de nordlige strækninger af Transjordanien i syd udgjorde Syrien nu en integreret geografisk og politisk enhed. Mange af Syrien mindretal samtykkede i stilhed i afslutningen af det franske overherredømme, som ellers havde været deres billet til indflydelse. Det skete i erkendelse af, at deres skæbne nu lå hos sunni-muslimerne – om de kunne lide det eller ej. Mange af Syriens mindretal lærte dog hurtigt at kæmpe sig vej ind i samfundet igen. Da det stod klart for alawitterne, at de ikke længere kunne klamre sig til drømmen om deres eget land, begyndte de at ‘oversvømme’ den mest håndfaste nationalistiske gruppe på scenen: Baath-partiet – og især dets militære fløj. Ad den vej blev den syriske baathisme reelt til en skal omkring alawitternes sag. Alawitterne blev nu forsvarere af pan-arabismen i Baath-partiet for at vinde politisk troværdighed. Men med det regime, Hafez al-Assad satte sig på i 1970, blev tilknytningen til det oprindelige sekteriske miljø åbenlys. Trods påstanden om at favne alle syrere – og at personer med alle mulige religiøse baggrunde kunne optages i partiledelsen – betragtede de fleste syrere snart Baath-partiet som en ideologiske facade for en langt smallere dagsorden: et alawi-herredømme med stærke rødder i landsbyerne i Ansariya-bjergene oppe ved Middelhavet mod nordvest. Det var herfra, Hafez al-Assad rekrutterede medlemmer til den politiske inderkreds, til hæren og til den magtfulde sikkerhedstjeneste.”

(Khader 2015: 72)

“In 1946, the Republic of Syria became an independent state. From northern Mesopotamia to the northern stretches of Transjordan, Syria would henceforth constitute an integral geographic and political unit. Many of Syria’s minorities acquiesced quietly to the end of French rule, recognizing that their fate lay with the Sunni Muslims whether they liked it or not. Many of Syria’s minorities learned to overcome their skepticism by enthusiastically muscling their way into the mainstream. Specifically, when it became clear that they would no longer profit by clinging to the dream of separatism, the ‘Alawis began flooding the ranks of the most robustly Arab nationalist group on the scene: the Baath Party, especially its military wing. Thus, the very community that stuck out by dint of its “heretical beliefs” and geographical isolation became the leaders of a movement that claimed adamantly to transcend sectarianism in the name of “Arabness”. Armed with this new raison d’être, and paired with a long tradition of military service, ‘Alawis became the defenders of ‘Aflaq’s “eternal Arab message”. The ‘Alawis in the Baath Party may have earned political credibility as the guardians of Arabness, but the regime established by Hafez al-Asad in 1970 never managed to distance itself from a perceived attachment to its original sectarian milieu. Indeed, despite its pretensions to embrace all Syrians and to incorporate individuals from a range of backgrounds into the party leadership, many continued to look upon Baathism as the ideological facade for a much narrower agenda of ‘Alawi rule. For allies and opponents of the regime alike, all roads led back to the mountain villages of Jabal Ansariyya, from which Asad recruited many members of his inner circle and the powerful security services.”

(Sahner 2014: 107-108)

“KLANEN ASSAD”, S. 74-78

Sammenlignet med:

Christian Sahner (2014): *Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present*. Oxford University Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 250 ud af 1166 ord = ca. 21,5 pct. af kapitlet

“I første omgang havde han [Assad, red.] dog held med at dæmpe de troendes bekymringer gennem omhyggeligt orkestrerede offentlige optrædener, hvor han bad sammen med fremtrædende sunni-præster ved vigtige helligdage og øgede bevillingerne til ministeriet for religiøse donationer. Men de konservative sunnimuslimers utilfredshed hørte ikke op. De blev nærmere bragt i kog, ikke mindst da Hafez al-Assad greb ind i Den Libanesiske Borgerkrig i 1976 – på samme side som maronitterne, et gammelt kristent folkeslag. Det så pludselig ud, som om Assad arbejdede for at underminere sunnitternes magt i hele regionen. Spændingerne spidsede til med anholdelsen af Marwan Hadid, en populær prædikant tilknyttet Det Muslimske Broderskab, der talte kraftigt imod Assad-regimet. Hadid indledte en sultestrejke i fængslet og døde efterfølgende, og Broderskabet holdt regeringen ansvarlig for ‘mordet’. Islamistiske elementer i Syrien begyndte derpå at organisere sig til væbnet konflikt, og tre år senere indledte de deres oprør med et angreb mod nogle alawit-kadetter stationeret i byen Aleppo. Det indledte en periode med kaos, som ændrede Syrien dramatisk. Efter hårde kampe sejrede Hafez al-Assad i borgerkrigen og landsforviste Broderskabets tilhængere og deres allierede. Men Assad indså også, at han manglede opbakning blandt millioner af syriske sunnimuslimere. Noget måtte der gøres for at styrke regimets legitimitet, og siden den islamistiske opstand i Syrien sluttede i 1982, har Assad-styret forsøgt at forbedre sit ry blandt sunnimuslimere ved at støtte religiøse institutioner, der ikke ligefrem anses som politisk undergravende.”

(Khader 2015: 74-75)

“At first, Assad managed to soothe these anxieties through carefully orchestrated public gestures, such as praying with prominent Sunni clergymen on important holidays and increasing the expenditures of the Ministry of Awfaq (religious endowments). Still, the objections of many conservative Sunni Muslims did not abate. These were brought to a boil by Assad’s intervention in the Lebanese Civil War in 1976 on the side of the Maronite Christians. Suddenly, it seemed that Assad the ‘Alawi was working to undermine Sunnis throughout the region by building alliances with other powerful minorities. This was unacceptable. Things came to a head in 1976 with the arrest of Marwan Hadid, a popular preacher affiliated with the Brotherhood, who spoke forcefully against the regime. Hadid staged a hunger strike in prison and eventually died, and the Brotherhood held the government accountable for his “murder.” Islamist elements in the country began to organize and arm, and three years later, they launched their insurgency with the attack against the ‘Alawi cadets in Aleppo. This inaugurated a period of turmoil that would change Syria dramatically. After much effort, Assad emerged the victor in the civil war, managing to banish the Brotherhood and its allies from the country. Still, although it was clear that the regime needed to quash all remaining manifestations of threatening religious activism, Assad realized that he also suffered from a major gap in legitimacy among observant Sunni Muslims. Something had to be done to beef up the regime in the eyes of the very people who opposed it most vigorously. [...] After the Islamist uprising in Syria ended in 1982, the government attempted to improve its image among observant Sunni Muslims by financing religious institutions whose brand of Islam was deemed to be politically unthreatening.”

(Sahner 2014: 136-137)

“ARABISK ASYL”, S. 118-121

Sammenlignet med:

George Sadek (2013): “Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq”. The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center,
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugees/legal-status-refugees.php>

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 550 ud af 1044 ord = ca. 53 pct. af kapitlet

“Egypten, som faktisk har ratificeret FN’s flygtningekonvention, har et forbehold til artikel 22 om flygtninges ret til adgang til offentlige skoler. Og myndighederne udsteder kun en seks-måneders opholdstilladelse, der skal fornys, sammen med flygtningekortet. Palæstinensiske flygtninge kan dog opnå en længere opholdstilladelse, afhængig af hvornår de er ankommet til Egypten: Palæstinensiske flygtninge, der kom til Egypten i 1948, har i dag en opholdstilladelse, der skal fornys hvert femte år, mens palæstinensere, der kom i 1967, har opholdstilladelser, der skal fornys hvert tredje år. Egypten har ikke forbehold til artiklerne 17 og 18 i Flygtningekonventionen – artiklerne, der beskytter flygtninges ret til at tage arbejde. Men ét er retten til at arbejde i landet, noget andet er at få en egyptisk arbejdstilladelse: Artikel 11 i resolution 390 af 1982, udstedt af det egyptiske beskæftigelsesministerium, kræver, at arbejdsgiveren beviser, at ingen egyptisk statsborger er tilgængelig og kan påtage sig arbejdet i stedet. Først da kan en arbejdstilladelse komme på tale. Flygtninge må heller ikke eje ejendom i Egypten. Lov nr. 104 af 1985 forhindrer udenlandske personer og virksomheder i at eje landbrugsjord, frugtbar jord eller ørkenjord i Egypten. Lov nr. 154 af 2004 om nationalitet forhindrer børn af udlændinge, som er født på egyptisk jord, i at opnå statsborgerskab, da egyptisk statsborgerskab kun gives på baggrund af afstamning.”

(Khader 2015: 118-119)

“While Egypt made a reservation to article 22, section 1 of the Convention, denying refugees the right to be admitted to public schools, the Egyptian Minister of Education issued Ministerial Decree No. 24 in 1992, allowing the children of recognized refugees from Sudan and the children of Sudanese, Libyan, and Jordanian political asylum seekers to attend public schools.[5] Refugees are provided with a UNHCR blue refugee card, which is stamped by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior (the Refugee Affairs section in the Ministry’s Department of Migration and Citizenship). A renewable residence permit, with a duration of six months, is also provided with the refugee card. According to Decree No. 8180 of 1996, issued by the Ministry of Interior, refugees generally receive a three-year temporary residency permit. Palestinian refugees may receive a longer residency permit, depending on when they arrived. Palestinian refugees who arrived in 1948 receive residency permits that are renewable every five years, but Palestinians who arrived in 1956 receive residency permits that are renewable every three years.[6] Egypt did not make a reservation against articles 17 and 18 of the Refugee Convention, which protect refugees’ rights to employment. However, Egyptian work permits are difficult to obtain. Article 11 of Ministerial Resolution 390 of 1982, issued by the Ministry of Labor, requires proof on the part of the employer that no Egyptian national is available to do the work before a permit may be issued.[7] [...]

- Law 104 of 1985 prevents foreign persons and companies from owning agricultural property, fertile land, or desert land in Egypt.[12]

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law 154 of 2004, amending Law 26 of 1975 on nationality, prohibits the children of foreigners who are born on Egyptian soil from acquiring citizenship, as Egyptian nationality is granted only on the basis of descent.[13]” <p>(Sadek 2013: 2-3)</p>
<p>“Irak, som også har mange syriske flygtninge, har ikke skrevet under på FN’s Flygtningekonvention. Den irakiske flygtningelov af 1971 giver flygtninge ret til at arbejde og sikrer dem adgang til sundhed og uddannelse på lige fod med irakere, men loven omhandler kun politiske flygtninge. Loven finder ikke anvendelse for flygtninge, der er flygtet fra deres hjemlande af andre grunde – og det gælder for eksempel de syriske flygtninge. Som følge af den syriske krise i 2011, der førte til borgerkrigen, har myndighederne i den kurdiske del af Irak dog givet syriske flygtninge ret til at blive indskrevet i de offentlige skoler og til at arbejde i regionen.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 119)</p>	<p>“While Iraq is not a party to the Refugee Convention, the Iraqi government has issued two legislative instruments related to refugees in Iraq. Law 21-2010 establishes the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, which provides assistance and services to both internally displaced persons and foreign refugees inside Iraq.[16] Second, the Political Refugee Law of 1971 addresses political refugees only, and establishes benefits such as the right to work and the same health and education services as Iraqis.[17] However, it does not apply to refugees who have fled their countries for other reasons.[18] [...] With respect to benefits offered to foreign refugees, Ministerial Resolution 202-2001 provides Palestinian refugees with all the benefits to which Iraqi nationals are entitled.[20] Following the Syrian Crisis in 2011, authorities in the Kurdish region of Iraq granted Syrian refugees the right to enroll in public schools and work in the region.[21]”</p> <p>(Sadek 2013: 3-4)</p>
<p>“Libanon, der ud over syrere også huser talrige irakere og palæstinensere, har ikke ratificeret FN’s flygtningekonvention. Libanon tillader dog, at flygtninge indskrives på libanesiske universiteter og får adgang til sundhed, men først efter registrering hos UNHCR, FN’s Flygtningehøjkommissariat. Herefter siger Libanon stop: Lov nr. 296 af 2001 forbyder udenlandske statsborgere, også fra anerkendte FN-stater, at eje fast ejendom, medmindre de opnår officiel tilladelse. I februar 2013 åbnede resolution nr. 1/19 op for, at flygtninge må arbejde inden for visse fag – dem, der har med bygninger, elektricitet og salg at gøre. De professioner var tidligere forbeholdt libanesiske</p>	<p>“According to the UN Refugee Agency, Lebanon hosts a considerable number of Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian refugees.[22] Although the Lebanese government created the Central Committee for Refugee Affairs in 1950 to administer the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In terms of benefits offered to refugees, the Lebanese government allows refugees to enroll in Lebanese universities and have access to primary health care after registering with the UNHCR. Concerning Palestinian refugees, Presidential Decree 42-1959 was issued to create the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs to contact the</p>

<p>statsborgere.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 119-120)</p>	<p>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East with respect to shelter, education, health, and social services.[23] In 2000, Decree No. 4082 was passed to change the name of the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs to the Department of Political and Refugee Affairs.[24] Law No. 296 of 2001 banned foreign nationals of recognized UN states from owning any real estate unless they obtain official permission.[25] In February 2013, Resolution No. 1/19 opened some professions, such as those involving construction, electricity, and sales, to refugees; those professions were previously restricted to Lebanese citizens.[26]”</p> <p>(Sadek 2013: 4-5)</p>
<p>“Jordan, der heller ikke har underskrevet flygtningekonventionen, har flere millioner flygtninge – palæstinensere, irakere og syrere. Ifølge en aftale fra 1998 mellem UNHCR og den jordanske regering kan asylansøgere blive i Jordan i seks måneder, efter at de er blevet registreret som flygtninge. Men de opnår ikke automatisk ret til bopæl, arbejde, uddannelse eller sundhedsvæsen. Artikel 31 i samme aftale giver indenrigsministeren bemyndigelse til at bestemme, fra sag til sag, hvorvidt personer, der er kommet ind i landet på illegal vis – og det er mange flygtninge – skal deporteres eller ej. Udlændinge i Jordan kan ikke bosætte sig i landet uden at erhverve sig en opholdstilladelse. Opnår en flygtning undtagelsesvis en sådan, er den i de fleste tilfælde kun gyldig i et år. Flygtningene er derfor formelt tvunget til at opholde sig i flygtningelejrene, hvad mange af gode grunde ikke gør – noget skal de jo leve af. De jordanske myndigheder anslår, at op mod 200.000 syriske flygtninge arbejder illegalt i Jordan. Den jordanske beskæftigelsesminister har – i erkendelse af tingenes tilstand – offentliggjort en konkret liste med erhverv og industrier, inden for hvilke kun jordanske statsborgere må arbejde. Listen inkluderer blandt andet: læger, ingeniører, administrative stillinger, regnskabs- og funktionærstillinger, beskæftigelse inden for telesektoren, salg, undervisning, frisører,</p>	<p>Jordan hosts Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees. According to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1998 between the UNHCR and the Jordanian government, asylum seekers can remain in Jordan for six months after recognition, during which time the UNHCR has to find a resettlement country for them.[27] While Jordan is not a signatory to the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution prohibits extradition of “political refugees.”[28] Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs requires that those entering the country as political asylum seekers present themselves to a police station within forty-eight hours of their arrival.[29] Article 31 of this Law grants the Minister of the Interior the authority to determine on a case-by-case basis whether persons that entered illegally will be deported. However, it does not identify conditions under which individuals will be eligible for asylum. It also does not impose any sanctions against asylum seekers who entered the country illegally. Refugees do not automatically acquire rights to residency, employment, public education, or health care. Foreigners cannot live in the country without acquiring a residency permit; such permits in most cases are valid for one year only.[30] Those permits are granted in small numbers to refugees. For instance, according to the UNHCR, just 30% of Iraqi refugees were granted residency permits.[31] In addition,</p>

dekoratører, brændstofsalg, elektriske og mekaniske erhverv, vagter, chauffører og bygningsarbejdere.”

(Khader 2015: 121)

about 160,000 Syrians are working illegally in Jordan.[32] The Jordanian Ministry of Labor also publishes a list of professions and industries in which only Jordanian citizens are allowed to work. These include medical, engineering, administrative, accounting and clerical professions; telephone and warehouse employment; sales; education; hairdressing; decorating; fuel sales; electrical and mechanical occupations; guards; drivers; and construction workers.”

(Sadek 2013: 5-6)

“PAN-ISLAMISME”, S. 122-123

Sammenlignet med:

Jeffrey T. Kenney (2005): “Pan-Islamism”. New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/britain-ireland-france-and-low-countries/british-and-irish-political-geography/pan-islamism>

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 360 ud af 432 ord = ca. 83 pct. af kapitlet

“Pan-islamisme er et udtryk af europæisk oprindelse. Det betegner de intellektuelle og institutionelle bestræbelser på at skabe en islamisk enhed. Idéen om en fælles islamisk identitet opstod i kolonitiden. Ledere i hele den muslimske verden opfordrede til modstand mod kolonimagterne og henviste til den religiøse arv og de symboler, som forenede alle muslimer og adskilte dem fra de kristne besættere. Den muslimske reformator Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) er en af de første kendte fortalere for pan-islamismen. Al-Afghani blev født i Iran – og ikke i Afghanistan, som hans navn antyder. Han var en omrejsende intellektuel aktivist, der uddannede sig i Iran og arbejdede i Indien, Afghanistan, Tyrkiet, Egypten og i Paris. Han mente, at den islamiske verden var politisk svag, socialt ustabil og kulturelt uvidende – og at noget burde gøres. Men i modsætning til wahabitterne i Saudi-Arabien mente al-Afghani ikke, at kontakten med Vesten var skyld i denne tilbageslåenhed. Han gjorde i stedet en indsats for at minde muslimerne om en væsentlig, men længe fraværende del af deres egen tradition. Nemlig den

“A term of European origin, *pan-Islamism* denotes the intellectual and institutional trends toward Islamic unity that emerged among Muslim peoples, starting in the mid-nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth century. The need for a unified Islamic identity was a product of the challenges posed by Western intervention in and domination of Muslim societies during the colonialist period. Leaders throughout the Muslim world appealed to the Islamic tradition to solidify public opposition to foreign occupation and thereby gain political independence. Like its European namesakes pan-Hellenism and pan-Slavism, pan-Islamism used cultural ideas to achieve nationalist political ends. Unlike the ethnic identities emphasized in European nationalisms, however, pan-Islamism emphasized the religious heritage and symbols that both united all Muslims and set them apart from their Western Christian colonialist occupiers. [...] Nowhere is this resolution more clearly defined than in the life and work of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), a Muslim reformer and key advocate of pan-Islamism.

<p>rationelle tænkning. Vestens magt og succes hvilede, ifølge al-Afghani, på evnen til at gå på kompromis med de hæmmende elementer i kristendommen. Og da islam havde rod i rationalisme, behøvede muslimerne såmænd bare at vende tilbage til essensen af deres tro for at indhente det forspring, som længe havde adskilt de vestlige og de muslimske samfund.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 122)</p>	<p>Born in Persia, not Afghanistan as his name suggests, al-Afghani led the life of an itinerant scholar and activist. After his initial education in Persia, he studied in India and then worked in Afghanistan, Istanbul, Egypt, and Paris. Al-Afghani's travels provided him with a unique insight into the modern condition affecting all Muslim peoples, a condition he believed was characterized by political weakness, social instability, and cultural ignorance. Contact with the West did not cause this condition, according to al-Afghani, but it did bring it into high relief; it also alerted Muslims to an essential but long-dormant element of their own tradition: rational thought. For al-Afghani, the power and success of the modern West rested on its rejection of the stultifying restrictions of Christianity and its turn toward reason; since Islam, by contrast, was rooted in rationalism, Muslims need only return to the essence of their faith to overcome the developmental asymmetry that had come to differentiate Western and Muslim societies.”</p> <p>(Kenney 2005)</p>
<p>“1800-tallets osmanner-sultaner tog pan-islamismen til sig, men til forskel fra al-Afghanis tanker skete det med imperialistiske og ikke nationalistiske mål. I 1860'erne forsøgte sultan Abdülaziz at udvide sin politiske autoritet over Det Osmanniske Rige ved at besmykke sig selv med titlen som kalif – og forsvarer af troen. Denne pan-islamiske appel var begrundet i den voksende vestlige indflydelse i den muslimske verden. Osmannerne havde for eksempel oplevet en af rigets mest betydningsfulde provinser, Egypten – der dengang ikke var en national enhed, som i dag, men en homogen provins – blive invaderet og besat af Napoleon i 1798.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 122-123)</p>	<p>“If al-Afghani was the father of pan-Islamist thought, Ottoman sultans were the first to implement pan-Islamism as official state policy, a policy with imperialist, not nationalist, goals. As early as the 1860s, the then-sultan, Abdul Aziz (r. 1861–1876), tried to extend his political authority beyond the Ottoman Empire by casting himself as the caliph, the designated ruler of all Muslims and the defender of the faith. His successor, Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876–1909), adopted the same mantle of authority. This pan-Islamic appeal was tied to the growing Western influence in the Muslim world that the Ottomans themselves had facilitated through their efforts to reform. The need to reform had become apparent as European peoples began to win back territory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had been lost to the Ottoman expansion into Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The same rising tide of technological advancement that had allowed European nations to defeat the Ottomans in Europe also permitted them to project their</p>

	<p>power abroad. This new political reality was made clear to the Ottomans when, in 1798, one of their autonomous possessions, Egypt, was invaded and occupied by the French under Napoléon Bonaparte.”</p> <p>(Kenney 2005)</p>
<p>“1900-tallets opdeling af den arabiske verden i nationalstater gav siden anledning til nye varianter af pan-islamismen. Dannelsen af Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) i 1969 var et udtryk for de kollektive følelser og bekymringer blandt muslimer. I de senere årtier har islamismen gjort krav på den pan-islamiske arv, men i form af et forsøg på at underminere det moderne system af nationalstater, der inddeler den muslimske verden. Hvor pan-islamismen traditionelt set talte for enhed blandt alle muslimer, virker dette forhold ikke til at være synderligt højt på den dagsorden, vore dages islamister opererer efter med deres ønske om at (gen-)islamiserer alle aspekter af samfundet.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 123)</p>	<p>“The division of the Muslim world into nation-states has given rise to new strands of pan-Islamism. First, transnational organizations like the Organization of Islamic States (OIC) have been formed to express the collective sentiments and concerns of Muslim peoples. [...] Second, Islamism, or Muslim fundamentalism, has laid claim to the pan-Islamic heritage in order to remake, if not undermine, the modern system of nation-states that divides Muslim societies. While pan-Islamism advocates Muslim unity and strength, it is not conducive to the totalizing agenda espoused by Islamists who wish to (re-)Islamize every aspect of society.”</p> <p>(Kenney 2005)</p>

“KAMPEN OM ISLAM”, S. 161-171

Sammenlignet med:

- 1) Florence Gaub (2014): “Islamism and Islamists: A very short introduction”. European Union Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_28_Islamism.pdf
- og 2) Loretta Napoleoni (2014): *The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 1400 ud af 2651 ord = ca. 50 procent af kapitlet

<p>“Der er tre begivenheder, som især har været afgørende for vor tids islamisme - og vore dages vold: opløsningen af Det Osmanniske Rige i 1924, som også var opløsningen af et kalifat; oprettelsen af Det muslimske Broderskab i 1928 i Egypten; og grundlæggelsen af Saudi-Arabien i 1932. Da osmanner-kalifatet forsvandt, opstod der et politisk vakuum i sunni-islam, da kalifatet i teorien havde været en suveræn stat, der samlede alle muslimer under én politisk og religiøs leder.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 164)</p>	<p>“The beginning of modern Islamism can be traced back to around the time the Ottoman empire collapsed. Three events then set in motion the dynamics responsible for much of the violence seen today: the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, and the foundation of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The disappearance of the caliphate created a vacuum in Sunni political Islam. In theory, the caliphate is a sovereign state uniting all Muslims under one political and spiritual leader.”</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 1)</p>
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“Omkring samme tid grundlagde en egyptisk skolelærer ved navn Hassan al-Banna Det Muslimske Broderskab i Egypten. Broderskabet havde tre mål med sit virke: at pøde det sociale liv med islamiske værdier; at indføre islamisk lov på lang sigt, og at gøre en ende på den fremmede besættelse af muslimske lande. Al-Bannas vision var både progressiv og forsigtig. Han var fortæller for en re-islamisering gennem mission, påvirkning, information og velgørenhed. Hassan al-Banna betragtes som faderen til det, der akademisk kaldes den sunnimuslimske gren af den “liberale” islamisme. Fundamentet til den “revolutionære” islamisme inden for sunni-islam blev lagt 20 år senere af den egyptiske forfatter Sayyid Qutb, der forkastede al-Bannas tro på, at man kunne nå sine mål trin for trin. Qutb mente, at kun en voldelig omstyrtelse af de eksisterende regimer, som han anså for at være u-islamiske, ville berede vejen for grundlæggelsen af en islamisk stat. Hans propaganda for disse holdninger førte til hans henrettelse i 1966. Al-Banna og Qutb, som begge var muslimske brødre, er i dag en slags stamfædre til de to fraktioner, som overordnet set har domineret den sunni-islamistiske tankeverden siden 1950’erne: Den progressive og valgbaserede tilgang versus den revolutionære og om nødvendigt terroristiske tilgang. Saudi-Arabien var den første arabiske stat, der baserede sin konstitution og hele sin eksistens på islam. Landet blev straks tilflugtssted for islamister, der blev forfulgt andre steder i den arabiske verden, og fik snart rollen som et af regionens religiøse kraftcentre, da rigdommene fra olieproduktionen tillod landet at sprede sit eget ‘brand’ af sunni-islamismen – wahabismen - fra slutningen af 1960’erne og frem.”

(Khader 2015: 164-165)

“Wahabismen er i sin essens det samme som salafismen, men salafisme betragter mange i dag som en religiøs kerne i et krigerisk foretagende. Salafismen er dog ikke nødvendigvis militant. Eksempelvis har Egypten i dag et salafistisk parti, der ikke virker ved vold, og som stadig er tilladt – præsident al-Sisi har kun forbudt

“Around the same time as the fall of the Ottoman empire, school teacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The society had three objectives, which have since remained largely the same: social renewal based on Islamic values, the long-term implementation of traditional Islamic law, and ending foreign occupation of Muslim lands (at that time by the United Kingdom). Al-Banna’s vision was a progressive and gradual one: he advocated re-Islamisation through means of charity and information, and can be seen as the founding father of what is now the Sunni branch of electoral Islamism. The foundations of Sunni revolutionary Islamism were laid down twenty years later by Sayyid Qutb, also an Egyptian civil servant. Qutb rejected al-Banna’s incremental approach and believed that only the violent overthrow of existing regimes (all of which he considered ‘un-Islamic’) would lead to the establishment of a fully Islamic state – a position which led to his execution in 1966. Al-Banna and Qutb, albeit both Muslim Brothers, symbolise the two factions which have dominated the re-Islamisation movement since the 1950s: the progressive/electoral versus the revolutionary/terrorist approach. Created shortly after the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia was the first Arab state to base its existence on Islam. A safe haven for Islamists persecuted elsewhere in the Arab world, the country only gained traction as the region’s ideological powerhouse after the sudden and exponential production of oil allowed it to spread its own ‘brand’ of Sunni Islam – Salafism or Wahabism – from the late 1960s onwards.”

(Gaub 2014: 2)

“Salafism as a movement is not necessarily a militant one. It is a school of thought advocating the return to the purest form of Islam as practiced by Muhammad’s ‘companions’ – Salaf meaning ancestors or predecessors. Today, Salafism is practiced mainly in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar – and is strongly

<p>Broderskabet. Man kan selvfølgelig ikke udelukke, at al-Sisis dispositioner er en følge af, at han økonomisk er i lommen på saudierne. Men årsagen kan også være at salafismen ikke i sig selv er voldelig: En salafist er fortaler for en tilbagevenden til den rene form for islam, som blev praktiseret af Muhammeds ledsagere. <i>Salaf</i> betyder forfader eller forgænger. I dag praktiseres salafismen primært i Saudi-Arabien og i De Forenede Arabiske Emirater, hvor lydighed over for autoriteten er nøgleordet. Der følger et vist besvær med at være slafist i en moderne, sekulær verden – hvad saudiernes dobbelte standarder fint demonstrerer. Derudover er trosretningens største udfordring i dag, at de mest berygtede bevægelser inden for den revolutionære islamisme – al-Qaeda, Islamisk Stat, Boko Haram i Nigeria og al-Shabaab i Somalia – ser sig selv som den rigtige salafister – og alle nuværende muslimske regeringer som u-islamiske og dermed legitime mål for voldelige angreb.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 165-166)</p>	<p>influenced by the conviction that obedience to authority is key. Proponents of revolutionary Islamism (who see themselves as the real Salafis) disagree with this notion, and see all current Muslim governments as un-Islamic and therefore legitimate targets.”</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 2)</p>
<p>“Det islamiske begreb om jihad dækker over to ting: Den »store jihad« er den enkelte muslims daglige, åndelige kamp mod fristelser, mens den »lille jihad« er den fysiske kamp mod fjender. Betydningen af sidstnævnte jihad har udviklet sig over århundrederne, mens den store jihad er forblevet den samme. Tidligere var den lille jihad først og fremmest tænkt som et værktøj til at beskytte samfundet af troende. Da den blev formuleret, skelnede de religiøst lærde mellem to former for lille jihad – en defensiv og en offensiv. Førstnævnte var pligten for alle medlemmer i samfundet til at gribe til våben mod fjenden for at beskytte islam. Den offensive jihad kunne kun beordres af kaliffen, herskeren over fællesskabet, når han ville udbrede og ikke bare beskytte islam. Den form for jihad, Islamisk Stat i dag prædiker, tager både den store og den lille jihad meget bogstaveligt, og det er derfor, man kan betegne deres overbevisning som jihadistisk.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 166)</p>	<p>“However, there are two types of jihad: the great jihad, which is mostly spiritual, that is, the daily fight of each individual against his or her temptations; and the small jihad, the physical fight against an enemy. What interests us here is this latter type, whose concept has evolved through the centuries, while the great jihad has remained unchanged. Formulated when Islam was already a superpower, the idea of the small jihad reflected an imperial spirit. It was a tool to protect the community of believers. Religious scholars of this period further distinguish two forms of small jihad: defensive and offensive. The former was the obligation of all members of the community to take up arms against the enemy to safeguard Islam. The offensive jihad, on the other hand, could be called only by the Caliph, the ruler of the community. Its task was to spread Islam, not to protect it. The jihad that the Islamic State is waging falls into both of these categories.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 75)</p>
<p>”Khomeinis revolution havde dog en vis betydning, selv om man skal huske på, at</p>	<p>“Ayatollah Khomeini claimed Iranian supremacy over all Muslims (in spite of the</p>

<p>ayatollahen påberåbte sig et iransk overherredømme over alle verdens muslimer – på trods af det faktum, at Iran er en shia-stat, og at omkring 90 procent af alle muslimer er sunnitter – og åbent opfordrede til at omstyrte Golf-monarkierne. De revolutionære sunni-islamister hentede faktisk inspiration i Irans succesfulde eksempel og har – paradoksal nok – lejlighedsvis været finansieret af Teheran. For eksempel bliver den sunnimuslimske organisation Hamas delfinansieret af Iran. Fra iransk side har der været flere konkrete forsøg på at vælte andre arabiske regimer, først det saudisk i 1979 og siden det bahrainske i 1981. Den revolutionære islamisme har længe været en reel trussel mod de arabiske regimer, uanset om den er sunni- og shia-baseret.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 167-168)</p>	<p>fact that Iran is a Shia state and around 90% of Muslims are Sunni) and openly called for an overthrow of the Gulf monarchies. Sunni revolutionary Islamism, albeit different in many ways, drew inspiration from Iran’s successful example, and has, on occasion, been funded by Tehran, too. While the rhetoric emanating from Iran was frightening enough to its neighbours, actual attempts to topple first the Saudi regime in 1979 and then the Bahraini one in 1981 confirmed revolutionary Islamism (whether Sunni or Shia) as a genuine threat to Arab regimes.”</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 2-3)</p>
<p>“Egyptens præsident Anwar Sadat blev i 1981 myrdet af medlemmer af den sunnimuslimske terrorbevægelse Islamisk Jihad under en militærparade. Da lignende grupper begyndte at tage form i Algeriet, de palæstinensiske områder og i Libanon, valgte de arabiske regimer flere forskellige taktikker til at modvirke den revolutionære islamisme: én var anti-iransk propaganda, en anden dialog med de islamistiske grupper, man anså for moderate. En tredje vej opstod efter Sovjets invasion af Afghanistan i 1979: Regimerne begyndte aktivt at opmuntre unge mænd, der var tilhængere af den revolutionære islamisme, til at gribe til våben mod den kommunistiske besættelse af muslimsk jord. Forhåbningen om, at islamismen og mænd som Osama bin Laden ville forsvinde i de afghanske bjerge, viste sig at være en skæbnesvanger illusion. De revolutionære islamister blev i stedet hærdet af kampene mod russerne. Og de fik, hvad de betragtede som en sejr, med den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning i 1988. Efter ankomsten af amerikanske styrker på Den Arabiske Halvø i forbindelse med Saddam Husseins invasion af Kuwait i 1990 blev ‘besætterne’ fra USA og deres arabiske medløbere en del af et opdateret islamistisk fjendebillede. De tilbagevendte ‘hellige’ krigere fra Afghanistan – “afghanerne” kaldte man</p>	<p>“Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by Islamic Jihad during a military parade, and similar groups began to form in Algeria, the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. Arab governments chose three broad tactics to counter revolutionary Islamism: repress their populations, engage in a sectarian war of words against Iran, and co-opt certain Islamist groups considered to be moderate. A fourth tactic emerged following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: it provided a welcome opportunity to actively encourage young men who adhered to revolutionary Islamism to take up arms against the communist occupation of Muslim lands. But the hope that the concept and these men, like Osama Bin Laden, would fade away in the mountains of Afghanistan proved false. Revolutionary Islamism was galvanised by the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the arrival of American forces in the Arabian Peninsula following the invasion of Kuwait, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s renunciation of violence, which led to the creation of Hamas in 1987. Returnees from Afghanistan began to train in camps in states such as Sudan, Yemen and Somalia, and established a database of those volunteers who had attended – hence the name al-Qaeda (Arabic for ‘the base’) attributed to the organisation by US secret services.</p>

<p>dem i den arabiske verden – begyndte at træne i lejre i stater som Sudan, Yemen og Somalia. Af de amerikanske efterretningstjenester tilskrives netop disse forhærdede krigere de terrorangreb, som blev et globalt fænomen fra 1998 og dannede skole for de aktiviteter, som grupper som al-Qaeda, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram og Al-Shabaab i dag står bag i forsøget på at svække regeringer og udløse opstand i de muslimske befolkninger.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 168-169)</p>	<p>Revolutionary Islamist terrorist attacks, involving suicide bombings, became a global phenomenon from 1998 onwards. Groups such as al Qaeda, IS, Beit al-Maqdis, Ansar al-Sharia and others routinely employ terrorism in an attempt to weaken governments and trigger a uprising of the Muslim population against their rulers.”</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 3)</p>
<p>“Den revolutionære islamisme, som Sayyid Qutb stod fadder til, er i dag berygtet over hele verden. Fra slutningen af 1970’erne var der dog også grupper, som valgte at følge Hassan al-Bannas tanker om en progressiv og trinvis islamisering af samfundet. I Sudan blev Den Nationale Islamiske Front optaget i parlamentet i 1979, og i 1988 stiftedes Den Islamiske Frelserfront i Algeriet. Hizbollah, der formelt blev dannet i 1985, er mest kendt som en milits, men har deltaget i Libanons valg siden 1992. Det Muslimske Broderskab, som i dag er forbudt i Egypten, har på individuel basis opstillet kandidater til valgene siden 1984. Deres palæstinensiske broderorganisation Hamas, vandt det palæstinensiske valg over mere moderate Fatah i 2006, mens Tayyip Erdogans konservative parti AKP i Tyrkiet, grundlagt i 2001, sikrede sig et flertal i 2002 og har været ved magten lige siden. I Irak har dusinvis af islamistiske partier – både af shia- og sunni-observans – domineret det politiske landskab efter fjernelsen af Saddam Hussein i 2003.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 169)</p>	<p>“Less prominent than revolutionary Islamists, electoral Islamists – groups which chose to follow Hassan al-Banna’s tactic of a progressive and gradual Islamisation of society – also emerged on the political scene from the late 1970s onwards. This happened first in Sudan with the admission of the National Islamic Front to parliament in 1979, and later with the creation of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1988. Hizbullah, a Shiite militia created in 1984 with Iran’s support, has participated in Lebanon’s elections since 1992. The Muslim Brotherhood, albeit formally banned, fielded individual candidates for political office in Egypt from 1984 onwards. Its Palestinian counterpart, Hamas, won the elections in 2006, while the Turkish AKP, founded in 2001, secured a majority in 2002 and has been in power ever since. In Iraq, dozens of Islamist parties – both Shia and Sunni – have dominated the political landscape following the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003.”</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 3)</p>
<p>“Det var omstyrtelsen af regeringerne i Tunesien og Egypten under Det Arabiske Forår, der gav de liberale sunni-islamistiske partier den nødvendige affyringsrampe til at vinde reel politisk magt. I Tunesien fik Ennahda (den tunesiske udgave af Det Muslimske Broderskab) 37 procent af stemmerne ved landets første frie valg i 2011. I Egypten deltog seks islamistiske partier ved valget i november 2011, hvor Det Muslimske Broderskabs parlamentariske aflægger, Friheds- og Retfærdighedspartiet, fik 34,9 procent af stemmerne, mens deres</p>	<p>“But it was the overthrow of governments in Tunisia and Egypt which provided Sunni Islamist political parties with the necessary launch pad to come to power. In Tunisia, Ennahda (the Tunisian outlet of the Muslim Brotherhood), won 37% of votes cast in the country’s first free elections; in Egypt, six Islamist parties participated in the 2011 elections, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party winning 34.9% and its Salafi competitor, Nour, 25%. The Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Muhammad Morsi, then went on to become</p>

<p>salafistiske konkurrent, partiet Nour, fik 25 procent. Det Muslimske Broderskabs kandidat, Mohamed Mursi, blev herefter præsident i 2012 med opbakning fra 51,73 procent af stemmerne. Selv om disse islamistiske partier i bred forstand deler samme politiske mål, er de alligevel uenige om indhold og strategi. I Egypten tilsluttede Nour sig en alliance, der var imod Det Muslimske Broderskab – og det på trods af deres fælles islamiske baggrund. Begrundelsen lød, at Broderskabet var for 'fleksible' på emneområder såsom kvinder og kristne i offentlige embeder og tolerance over for Iran. Efter traditionen fra Hassan al-Banna – og i stærk kontrast til Islamisk Stat – søgte Det Muslimske Broderskab i Egypten ikke etableringen af en stat, der omfattede hele det muslimske samfund. Selv om al-Banna havde en komplet islamisk stat for øje, accepterede han Egyptens eksistens som et land.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 169-170)</p>	<p>president in 2012 with 51.73% of the vote. Although these parties share a broad political goal, they nevertheless disagree over content and strategy. In Egypt, Nour joined the anti Muslim Brotherhood alliance in spite of their shared Islamist background, arguing that the Brotherhood is too flexible on issues such as allowing women and Christians to serve in office, and too tolerant towards Iran. In the tradition of Hassan al-Banna (and in stark contrast to IS), the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood did not seek the establishment of a state encompassing all of the Muslim community. Although al-Banna favoured the pursuit an all-Islamic state, he nevertheless accepted the existence of Egypt as a country.“</p> <p>(Gaub 2014: 3-4)</p>
<p>“I dag er der kun nogle få stater, der er kommet i nærheden af at realisere det fælles-islamistiske ideal om en islamisk stat: Taliban-styret i Afghanistan fra 1996 til 2001, i en vis udstrækning Sudan siden 1989 og så selvfølgelig Saudi-Arabien og Iran. Saudi-Arabien har erklæret den lille jihad for ulovlig på egen jord og hævder, at landets politiske system er helt i tråd med den islamiske doktrin, og at der intet behov er for valg eller politisk mangfoldighed. På den anden side af Den Persiske Golf er Irans politiske system baseret på shiitiske gejstliges overherredømme. Forskellen mellem de to stater og deres regionale indflydelse er, at bevægelser som Hizbollah accepterer Irans autoritære rolle, mens både liberale og revolutionære sunni-islamistiske bevægelser fra tid til anden udfordrer Saudi-Arabien. Selv om de islamistiske bevægelser ideologisk adskiller sig fra Iran, hører man alligevel Teherans retorik om 'forandring' – hvilket nærer saudiernes frygt for en fremtidig alliance mellem Iran, deres evige geopolitiske rival, og sunni-'forandrerne'. I et forsøg på at tilbagerulle både den revolutionære og den liberale islamisme har Saudi-Arabien i de senere år ændret holdning i flere spørgsmål og</p>	<p>“There are currently only a few states which actually come close to embodying the ideal of an Islamic state. Aside from Saudi Arabia and Iran, Islamist governments have also existed in Afghanistan (1996 – 2001) and, to some extent, Sudan (since 1989). Both Saudi Arabia and Iran rest their legitimacy on a certain form of Islamism, although they are, in essence, authoritarian regimes. Saudi Arabia has declared jihad illegal on its soil and argues that as its political system is perfectly in line with Islamic doctrine, there is no need for elections or political pluralism. Across the Persian Gulf, Iran's political system is based on the supremacy of the Shiite clergy. The difference between the two states is that while Iran's revolutionary-turned-electoral outlets, such as Hizbullah, accept its authoritarianism, Sunni revolutionary and electoral Islamism challenge Saudi Arabia either by violent means or by offering a political alternative. Although ideologically distinct from Iran, the two wings nevertheless echo Teheran's rhetoric of change – fostering Saudi fears of an alliance between Sunni 'changists' and its geopolitical rival. These fears seem somewhat unfounded, given the different political goals of Sunni and Shia</p>

vedtaget en benhård linje. Senest har landet erklæret både Hizbollah og Det Muslimske Broderskab for terrororganisationer, selv om sidstnævntes ledelse har haft eksil i Saudi-Arabien i årtier. Og selv om saudierne engang støttede islamistiske grupper i Syrien, der kæmpede mod Assad-regimet, har de i dag tilsluttet sig den internationale koalition i bombekampagnen mod Islamisk Stat. Saudi-Arabien sendte også tropper til Bahrain i 2011 for at lægge låg på et shia-oprør, som de hævdede var iværksat af Iran. Selv om engagementet er forklædt i en doktrinær og sekterisk retorik, omhandler den aktuelle kamp mellem de islamiske fløje i sidste ende en kamp om politisk magt.”

(Khader 2015: 170-171)

revolutionary Islamism in Syria, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. In an attempt to roll back both revolutionary and electoral Islamism, Saudi Arabia has reversed some of its previous positions and adopted a hard line. It lately declared both Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood to be terrorist organisations, although the latter’s leadership was granted exile in Saudi Arabia for decades. And though the Saudis once supported Islamist groups in Syria fighting the Assad regime, it has joined the international coalition in its bombing campaign against IS. Riyadh also sent troops to Bahrain in 2011 to quell a Shia uprising it claimed was instigated by Iran. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia is financially supporting Egypt’s new government in order to ensure stability in a country which was traditionally a hub of political Islam. Although clothed in doctrinal and sectarian rhetoric, the current struggle among the three Islamist wings is ultimately one concerning political power.”

(Gaub 2014: 4)

“KALIFFEN AF ISLAMISK STAT”, S. 206-210

Sammenlignet med:

Loretta Napoleoni (2014): *The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 900 ud af 1260 ord = ca. 71 pct. af kapitlet

“Historien om Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Qurashi al-Husseini er omgærdet af uvished, ligesom hans evne til at undgå rampelyset er en del af iscenesættelsen. Det siges, at al-Baghdadi i lang tid tildækkede sig ansigt, selv foran sin mest betroede løjtnant, hvilket gav ham tilnavnet “den usynlige sheik”. Hemmelighedskræmmeriet, der omgiver den moderne kalif, er en del af hans image. Det siges, at al-Baghdadi blev født i 1971 i Samarra i Irak og fik navnet Ibrahim ibn Awwas al-Badri. I en biografi udgivet af jihadister får han følgende skudsmål med på vejen: “Han er en mand fra en religiøs familie. Hans brødre og onkler inkluderer imamer og professorer i arabisk sprog, retorik og logik.” I dag

“During this period al Baghdadi covered his face even in front of his most trusted lieutenants, earning him the nickname “the invisible sheikh.” The secrecy and mystery that surround the modern Caliph even now appear as the antithesis of parading and pontificating Western politicians and Arab dictators, whose ubiquitous images, plastered everywhere, boost their cults of personality. [...] Born in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq, al Baghdadi claims to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. According to a widely cited biography released by jihadists, “he is a man from a religious family. His brothers and uncles include imams and professors of Arabic language, rhetoric and logic.””

<p>hævder al-Baghdadi selv, at han er en direkte efterkommer af profeten Muhammed [...]”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 206)</p>	<p>(Napoleoni 2014: 30)</p>
<p>“Al-Baghdadi er uddannet i islamiske studier fra Bagdads universitet. Han underviste i teologi og arbejdede som imam i hovedstaden og i byen Fallujah 70 kilometer vest for Bagdad, indtil han i 2004 blev taget til fange af de amerikanske styrker, der dømte ham til at afsone en fængselsstraf i Camp Bucca i det sydlige Irak.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 206-207)</p>	<p>“Al Baghdadi himself holds a degree in Islamic Studies from the University of Baghdad, and worked as an imam in the capital and in Fallujah prior to his capture.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 30)</p>
<p>“I fængslet holdt Baghdadi lav profil, så amerikanerne aldrig fattede hans sande lederskabspotentiale. De tog ham for en ubetydelig oprører og løslod ham ifølge oplysninger fra Pentagon allerede i december måned samme år.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 207)</p>	<p>“Al Baghdadi’s preference for avoiding the limelight may have been cultivated while serving a five-year prison sentence in Bucca Camp in southern Iraq after being captured by US forces in 2005. Like his Jordanian predecessor, he kept a very low profile in prison, misleading the Americans as to his true potential for leadership.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 30)</p>
<p>“Hvad der skete i al-Baghdadis liv i årene derefter, er ikke fuldt belyst, men sikkert er det, at han i 2010, fire år efter terroristen Abu Musab al-Zarqawis død, overtog stillingen som leder af al-Qaeda i Irak. Inden da havde han sluttet sig til al-Zarqawis oprør, han havde arbejdet sig op til posten som emir af Rawa, en by nær den syriske grænse, hvor han bestyrede sin egen sharia-domstol og fik ry for brutalitet – ikke mindst offentlige henrettelser af formodede støtter af de amerikansk ledede koalitionsstyrker.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 207)</p>	<p>“Though it was not until 2010, four years after al Zarqawi’s death, that al Baghdadi stepped into his position of leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, the two men were part of the same operation for several years. With the start of the US invasion in 2003, al Baghdadi joined al Zarqawi’s group, Tawhid al Jihad, with the task of smuggling foreign fighters into Iraq. Later he became the emir of Rawa, a town near the Syrian border, where he presided over his own Sharia court and “gained a reputation for brutality, publicly executing those suspected of aiding the US-led coalition forces.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 29)</p>
<p>“I modsætning til de oprindelige ledere af al-Qaeda, som undgik at erobre land for i stedet at fokusere på den fjerne fjende, USA, har al-Baghdadi arvet al-Zarqawis tro på, at kampen vil mislykkes uden en stor og stærk territorial base i Mellemøsten. Al-Baghdadis drøm er lige så ambitiøs som den, al-Zarqawi jagtede – at genskabe kalifatet med centrum i Bagdad gennem en erobningskrig mod de nærmeste fjender: shiitterne i Irak og det korrupte oligarki, som hersker i Syrien.”</p>	<p>“Unlike the leaders of al Qaeda, who eschewed territorial conquest to focus on the far-away enemy, i.e., the United States, al Baghdadi shared al Zarqawi’s belief that without a large and strong territorial base in the Middle East their fight was destined to fail. His dream was as ambitious as the one that al Zarqawi had pursued: to recreate the Caliphate of Baghdad through a war of conquest against the near enemies—the corrupted, oligarchic elites who ruled Syria and Iraq, the Shiites.”</p>

(Khader 2015: 207)	(Napoleoni 2014: 28)
<p>“Som al-Zarqawi var det, er al-Baghdadi meget fokuseret på dag til dag-driften af sin organisation. Han er også opmærksom på at undgå udbredelsen af billeder og ord – en almindelig foreteelse blandt jihadist-ledere. Der eksisterer kun to kendte billeder af al-Baghdadi fra tiden, inden han blev udnævnt som kalif. Det ene billede viser en alvorlig mand med et olivenfarvet og rundt ansigt. Det andet, som blev offentliggjort af den irakiske regering i januar 2014, viser en bistert udseende, skægget skikkelse klædt i sort jakkesæt. Billedet er revnet og sløret, som om det er et billede af et billede.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 207-208)</p>	<p>“Like al Zarqawi, al Baghdadi focused on the day-to-day operations of the organization and avoided disseminating videos and making political pronouncements, common behavior among jihadist leaders. Only two known photos of al Baghdadi exist from before he was named Caliph. One shows a serious man with an olive complexion and round countenance. The other, released by the Iraqi government in January 2014, depicts an unsmiling, bearded figure in a black suit.²⁶ The image is cracked and blurry, as though it is a photo of a photo.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 30)</p>
<p>“I sin første officielle optræden for rullende kamera, efter sin ophævelse til kalif, talte han i den store moské i Mosul iklædt den traditionelle dragt for imamer. Han sagde: “Jeg er den wali [leder], der leder dig, selv om jeg ikke er den bedste af os. Hvis du kan se, at jeg har ret, hjælp mig. Hvis du kan se, at jeg tager fejl, rådgiv mig, led mig på rette spor, og adlyd mig, så længe som jeg adlyder Gud i dig.””</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 208)</p>	<p>“In his first official appearance after being elected Caliph, he spoke inside the Grand Mosque of Mosul, dressed in the traditional attire of an imam. His words were not those of a barbarous terrorist, but of a wise and pragmatic religious leader: “I am the wali [leader] who presides over you, though I am not the best of you, so if you see that I am right, assist me. If you see that I am wrong, advise me and put me on the right track, and obey me as long as I obey God in you.”²⁹“</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 31)</p>
<p>“Siden opstigningen til den globale scene er der draget paralleller mellem al-Baghdadi og Talibans Mullah Omar. Der er da heller ingen tvivl om, at al-Baghdadis religiøse skoling giver ham troværdighed, ligesom fortællingen om hans slægtskab med profeten og fremtrædende islamiske lærde har fremmet hans image. Men hvor Taliban var til koranskoler og viden baseret på profetens skrifter, har globaliseringen og den moderne teknologi været af vital betydning for Islamisk Stat. Mange af al-Baghdadis ‘hellige’ krigere er uddannet på vestlige universiteter og har bidraget med deres kendskab til moderne teknologi. Det er forhold som disse, der adskiller hans organisation fra de tidligere, og det er årsagen til Islamisk Stats enorme succes: moderniteten og pragmatismen. IS-lederskabet udviser en enestående forståelse for begrænsningerne og</p>	<p>“Since his ascent to the global stage, IS leader and Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi has drawn comparisons to al Qaeda’s Mullah Omar. Ironically, these comparisons may well have led Western intelligence to underestimate him and his organization’s strength. Despite its seemingly medieval approach to legality and social control, to deem the IS essentially backward would be mistaken. While the world of the Taliban was limited to Koranic schools and knowledge based upon the writings of the Prophet, globalization and modern technology have been the incubator of the Islamic State. What distinguishes this organization from all other armed groups that predate it— including those active during the Cold War—and what accounts for its enormous successes is its modernity⁴ and pragmatism. Its leadership shows an unparalleled grasp</p>

<p>mulighederne i en globaliseret verden. Eksempelvis fornemmede IS før de fleste andre, at en vestlig intervention som i Afghanistan, Libyen og Irak ikke ville være mulig i Syrien, da både lederne og civilbefolkningerne i Vesten var trætte af krig, da turen i princippet var kommet til Syrien.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 208)</p>	<p>of the limitations facing contemporary powers in a globalized and multipolar world. For example, IS sensed, before most others had, that joint foreign intervention of the sort that occurred in Libya and Iraq would not be possible in Syria.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 12-13)</p>
<p>“Al-Baghdadis parathed til at indgå alliance med lokale sunnimuslimske stammer er en anden del af opskriften på hans succes. Den strategi fremmer uafhængigheden af udenlandske sponsorer, som altid vil være en risikofaktor. Korrupsion, som har betydet undergangen for mange væbnede organisationer og regimer i den arabiske verden, er et andet onde, al-Baghdadi slår hårdt ned på.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 209)</p>	<p>“Al Baghdadi’s willingness to foster these alliances with local Sunni tribes is part of his strategy to speed up the process of independence from his sponsors. Financial independence, however, is not born exclusively from a desire to break with foreign sponsors. Rather, the privatization of terrorism offers IS tools to enforce loyalty among its fighters. That is, al Baghdadi has sought financial independence as an inoculation against the corruption of his forces. Corruption has been the downfall of many armed organizations and of all Arab regimes, without exception. Sponsorship, accordingly, is well known to breed a culture of bribery.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 43-44)</p>
<p>“Islamisk Stat adskiller sig også fra Taliban på en anden måde: I kontrast til den barbariske behandling af regimets fjender spreder Islamisk Stat et delvist positivt, ja nærmest optimistisk politisk budskab i den muslimske verden: brød, arbejde, værdighed, styrke og genetableringen af kalifatet – alt i alt en ny guldalder for islam. De løfterige ord kommer på et tidspunkt med stor uro i Mellemøsten: Syrien og Irak er i brand, Libyen er i ruiner, Yemen risikerer at blive overtaget af shia-Iran, Egypten er regeret af hæren, Israel befinder sig i en permanent undtagelsestilstand med endeløse problemer med grænsedragninger og store sikkerhedsspørgsmål på dagsordenen. På den baggrund ser sunnitterne ikke genfødslen af kalifatet under al-Baghdadi som endnu en væbnet gruppes tomme paroler, men som en lovende ny politisk enhed.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 209)</p>	<p>“In sharp contrast with the Taliban’s rhetoric, and despite its barbarous treatment of its enemies, the Islamic State is spreading a powerful, in part positive, political message in the Muslim world: the return of the Caliphate, a new Golden Age of Islam. This message comes at a time of great destabilization in the Middle East, with Syria and Iraq ablaze, Libya on the verge of another tribal conflict, Egypt restive and ruled by the army, and Israel once again at war with Gaza. Hence, the rebirth of the Caliphate under its new Caliph, al Baghdadi, appears to many Sunnis not as the emergence of yet another armed group but as the rise of a promising new political entity from the ashes of decades of war and destruction.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 13-14)</p>
<p>“Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi er den første islamiske leder siden den 31. kalif, ottomaneren Abdülmecid I (1823-61), der</p>	<p>“Abu Bakr al Baghdadi is the first Islamic leader since the 31st Caliph, Abdülmecid II (1823–61), to claim this title, and to satisfy</p>

<p>har gjort krav på kalif-titlen og tilfredsstillet nostalgien efter den tabte storhedstid. Generationer af fundamentalistiske sunnitter har drømt om det øjeblik, hvor det 20. århundredes arabiske grænser, tegnet af europæiske magter, blev slettet. Det er Islamisk Stat – ikke al-Qaeda – der nu har bragt denne drøm om tusindårsriget nærmere en virkeliggørelse.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 209)</p>	<p>the nostalgia for a lost world, a society associated with the golden age of early Islam, when, under the leadership of the first four caliphs, successors of the Prophet, Islam expanded territorially and blossomed culturally.⁶¹ Against this background it is easy to understand why generations of Sunni radicals have dreamt of the moment when the twentieth-century Arabian borders drawn by European powers would be erased. And it is the Islamic State, not al Qaeda, that has brought this dream to fruition.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 51)</p>
<p>“Al-Baghdadis territoriale helhedsplan er at genskabe det gamle kalifat, der strakte sig over det meste af den arabiske verden, indtil det blev ødelagt af mongolerne midt i 1200-tallet. I sin første tale som kalif lovede al-Baghdadi at vende tilbage til “værdighed, styrke, rettigheder og lederskab”. Han opfordrede læger, ingeniører, dommere og eksperter i islamisk retslære til at slutte sig til ham, og mens han talte, arbejdede et team af oversættere i hele verden på næsten i realtid at offentliggøre hans ord på jihadist-hjemmesider og Facebook- og Twitter-konti på flere sprog, herunder engelsk, fransk og tysk. Mange sunnimuslimer ser det i dag som Islamisk Stats rolle at være for islam, hvad Israel er for jøder – en hellig stat i et forhistorisk land, generhvervet i moderne tid. En stærk religiøs stat, der vil beskytte dem, uanset hvor de befinder sig.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 209-210)</p>	<p>“While territorially the master plan is to recreate the ancient Caliphate of Baghdad—an entity that stretched from the Iraqi capital all the way into modern Israel in its heyday, before being destroyed by the Mongols in 1258—politically the goal of the Islamic State is to craft its twenty-first-century incarnation. In his first speech as the new Caliph, al Baghdadi pledged to return to Muslims the “dignity, might, rights, and leadership” of the past and called for doctors, engineers, judges, and experts in Islamic jurisprudence to join him.⁶ As he spoke, a team of translators across the world worked to release, almost in real time, the text of his speech on jihadist websites, and on Facebook and Twitter accounts, in several languages including English, French, and German.⁷ To many, the Islamic State’s main aim is to be for Sunni Muslims what Israel is for Jews: a state in their ancient land, reclaimed in modern times; a powerful religious state that protects them wherever they are.”</p> <p>(Napoleoni 2014: 14-15)</p>

“LIBYENS KOLLAPS”, S. 210-213

Sammenlignet med:

Roger Owen (2014): *The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life: With a New Afterword*. Harvard University Press.

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 165 ud af 760 ord = ca. 21 pct. af kapitlet

“Muammar Gaddafi tog magten i Libyen i 1969, og noget tyder på, at han over tid

“Whatever Qaddafi’s mental state might have been when he first seized power in

<p>udviklede en type psykotisk personlighed, hvor verden skal gøres helt forudsigelig og lykkes som enhed for at undgå et psykisk sammenbrud. Det oplevede den italienske journalist Oriana Fallaci i 1979, da Gaddafi i et interview proklamerede, at en regering ikke længere fandtes i Libyen, men at "folkets magt var opnået, drømmen var opfyldt, og kampen var ovre." Ved samme lejlighed rapporterede Fallaci, at Gaddafi blev ved og ved med at råbe, at han var "evangeliet" i så lang tid, at hun måtte dæmpe ham. Gaddafi forsøgte i hele sin regeringstid at undergrave organisationer, som han ikke selv kunne kontrollere, for eksempel Maghreb, unionen af nordafrikanske stater. Han søgte i stedet alliancer, hvor han kunne påtvinge andre sit vælde. I 2010 anså han sig selv for "Afrikas Konge" og fløj afrikanske statsoverhoveder til Libyen og poserede foran dem i 'afrikansk' kostume af eget design med tilhørende absurde små runde kasketter."</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 210-211)</p>	<p>1969, there is now some evidence to suggest that, over time, he developed the type of psychotic personality whose world must be rendered entirely predictable by becoming a closed entity in order to avoid psychic collapse. This was certainly in evidence by the time of his interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1979, when he proclaimed to her that government no longer existed in Libya, that "the authority of the people is achieved, the dream is realized. The struggle is over." It was also on the same occasion, Fallaci reports, that he went on and on shouting that he was "the Gospel" for so long that "she had to quiet him down." [...] Meanwhile, as far as Libya's relations with the rest of the world are concerned, Qaddafi has always tried to subvert organizations that he cannot control, like the Maghreb Union of North African States, while seeking fresh regions on which to try to impose his presence. Hence in 2010 he saw himself as the "King of Africa," bringing African heads of state to Libya and posturing before them in "African" costumes of his own design with absurd-looking little round caps."</p> <p>(Owen 2014: 198-199)</p>
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"REKRUTTERING TIL ISLAMISK STAT", S. 219-224

Sammenlignet med:

Hassan Hassan (2015): "The secret world of Isis training camps – ruled by sacred texts and the sword". *The Guardian*, 25. januar 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/inside-isis-training-camps>

Sproglige sammenfald: ca. 600 ud af 1334 ord = ca. 45 pct. af kapitlet

"Sharia-oplæringen varierer fra medlem til medlem – afhængig af føringsofficerens vurdering af hans værdi eller loyalitet."

(Khader 2015: 220)

"Sharia training varies from one member to another, depending on the group's assessment of his value or loyalty."

(Hassan 2015)

"Rekrutten modtager også en slags grunduddannelse i religionen – han bombarderes med religiøse fortællinger. Han skal ligeledes studere arabisk og lære at tale rigsarabisk, hvis han ikke allerede kan det – hvad de færreste unge fra Vesten jo kan. Islamisk Stats religiøse ledere, der har ansvaret for den religiøse træning af

"You first get the basics about religion," said Abu Moussa, an Isis-affiliated religious cleric in eastern Syria but originally from Aleppo. "They cleanse you from religious innovations and Ba'athist ideas. Issuing fatwas is restricted to clerics and nobody can kill without a fatwa unless in the battlefield. You also study Arabic and learn

<p>rekrutterne, er hovedsageligt akademisk uddannede. Men Islamisk Stat er også afhængig af unge religiøse ledere, der nyligt har tilsluttet sig organisationen, for at kompensere for manglen på imamer. For at fremme indoktrineringen af de nye medlemmer sørger Islamisk Stat i øvrigt for at styre uden om lærdomme, der ikke er afledt af sharia-tekster.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 220)</p>	<p>how to speak in standard Arabic if you don't know.” Clerics in charge of religious training at Isis, known as sharii, are mostly academically qualified and have longstanding experience within the organisation's ranks. Isis also relies on young clerics who have recently joined its ranks to compensate for the shortage of imams to cover the approximately 20 mosques in every town that falls under its control. [...] In terms of indoctrination, Isis generally steers clear of exposing new members to teachings that are not derived from sharia texts.”</p> <p>(Hassan 2015)</p>
<p>“I træningslejrene får de desuden en uddannelse i militær og politik, varetaget af instruktører. Under træning kan rekrutterne blive sendt af sted til checkpoints for at 'træne' deres færdigheder, men ikke til frontlinjen. Når jihadistene har bestået forløbet, er han kriger, men forbliver under supervision og kan blive bortvist eller straffet – herunder pisket – hvis han ikke overholder reglerne eller udtrykker forbehold. Rekrutter, der får moralske skrupler med brutaliteten ved Islamisk Stats frontlinje, kan blive sendt tilbage til lejren for at få mere træning i bestræbelsen på at 'forstærke' hans tro.”</p> <p>(Khader 2015: 220-221)</p>	<p>“Inside the camps, students receive a mix of military, political and sharia orientation, usually given by around five instructors. During training, recruits can be dispatched to checkpoints but not to the frontlines. After they graduate, they will remain under supervision and can be expelled or punished in case of noncompliance – including being lashed if they express reservations. In some cases, new members who struggle with the brutality of the group's acts will be sent back to receive more training to “strengthen” their faith.”</p> <p>(Hassan 2015)</p>
<p>“Hvor nye medlemmer af Islamisk Stat næsten udelukkende får adgang til religiøse bøger, har Religionens Helte adgang til at studere manualer såsom <i>Management of Savagery</i>, skrevet af den egyptiske islamist Abu Bakr Naji, der led dronedøden i 2008. Abu Bakr Naji lærer sine følgere, at man kan skelne mellem jihad og andre religiøse retninger, derved, at jihad ikke handler om barmhjertighed, men om voldelig gengældelse, der skal afskrække fjenden. Der er klare sekteriske elementer i Islamisk Stats stærkt censurerede religiøse uddannelse. Organisationens selvbestaltede eksperter i troen graver sig dybt ned i den islamiske sharia-historie og finder nogle mystiske lærdomme, som de puster op og prædiker som en ren og sand form for islam, der er uforståelig for “almindelige mennesker og muslimer”. Blandt andet er Islamisk Stat begyndt at straffe folk, der</p>	<p>“New members are almost exclusively exposed to religious books, while established members or commanders can study manuals such as <i>Management of Savagery</i>, a jihad book written by an Abu Bakr Naji, who said that you should distinguish between jihad and other religious tenets in that jihad is not about mercy but about extreme retaliatory violence to deter enemies. [...] Indeed, one of the fascinating insights we found is that Isis presents the “mainstream” Islam practised by Muslims today as one that was “invented” over the past few decades. To unravel this so-called invented Islam, Isis deliberately digs deep into Islamic sharia and history to find arcane teaching and then magnify it. It does so to shock its potential recruits and demonstrate it is preaching a pure and true Islam obscured by the mainstream. Take, for example, the group's</p>

beskyldes for homoseksualitet, ved at smide dem ud fra høje bygninger. Den udartning af sharia er ukendt, selv i lande med en streng sharia-praksis såsom Saudi-Arabien. Det frastødende i denne form for afstraffelse er værdifuld for Islamisk Stat, da det udløser spørgsmål om praksissen, som IS-præsteskabet straks kan svare bedre på end de gængse imamer og religiøse ledere. Mange IS-medlemmer erkender i dag, at de er blevet draget af den måde, IS præsenterer islam på: med et absolut klarsyn, som for de fleste andre fremstår som det rene vanvid. I træningslejrene nyder Islamisk Stat godt af at kunne relatere mystiske, obskure fortællinger til deres egen fortælling. Islamisk Stat er stærkt afhængig af det, muslimske imamer ellers opfatter som isolerede hændelser i de hellige tekster – og som ikke skal efterfølges som regler. Men sådan er de IS-lærdes tilgang ikke: De bruger i stedet brudstykker i religiøse tekster til at retfærdiggøre halsoverskæringer over for medlemmer, der måske kæmper en indre kamp med, hvad de har gjort. Når disse brutale hændelser kan væves ind i den overordnede ideologi, er det nemmere for nye medlemmer at leve med dem. I Islamisk Stat prædiker man tilsyneladende historien om profeten Muhammads øverstkommanderende, den sagnomspundne krigsherre Khalid bin al-Walid, der dræbte hundredvis af fanger efter Slaget om Ullais i Irak i det syvende århundrede. Til Allah havde al-Walid afgivet et løfte om, at han ville lave en flod af blod fra den persiske hær. Da han ikke kunne finde tilstrækkeligt med nedslagtede modstandere til en flod af deres blod, dræbte han også krigsfangerne. Af profeten fik Khalid bin al-Walid tilnavnet "Guds frigjorte sværd", mens den første muslimske kalif, Abu Bakr, hylkede hans sejr. Når Islamisk Stat i dag bruger sagnene om Khalid bin al-Walid til at retfærdiggøre de ekstreme blodsudgydelser, er det i stærk modstrid med islamisk lærdom. Enhver imam uden for IS-sekten vil afvise den religiøse legalitet i disse handlinger, men desværre føler nye – ofte religiøst ubefæstede – rekrutter, at de er nu blevet en del af en sandere og renere islamisk mission."

punishment for individuals accused of homosexuality. In a series of incidents in recent weeks, Isis has thrown individuals accused of being gay from the highest buildings. This method as a sharia punishment is unheard of, even in countries where sharia brute justice is openly practised, such as Saudi Arabia. [...] But it is the obscurity of the punishment that makes it particularly valuable for Isis. The purpose is not to increase the volume of violence but also to raise eyebrows and trigger questions about such practices, which Isis is more capable of answering than mainstream clerics, who prefer to conceal teachings that propound such punishments. Many Isis members were eager to emphasise they were impressed by such obscure teachings, and were drawn to the group by the way Isis presents Islam with absolute lucidity. [...] Inside the camp, Isis benefits from relating these hidden, obscure stories to formulate its own narrative. Isis depends heavily on what Muslim clerics consider isolated incidents described in sacred texts that it believes should not be followed as rules. The function of such incidents is not necessarily to argue a doctrinal idea. Isis sometimes uses them to help members who struggle with beheading, for example, to justify what they have done. When these stories are weaved into the overall ideology of Isis, new members find it easier to accept them. The argument that these acts are not Islamic often ignores how such stories are told. For instance, Isis tells the story of Muhammad's commander-in-chief, Khaled bin al-Walid, who killed hundreds of captives after the 7th-century battle of Ullais in Iraq, seemingly contrary to Islamic teachings, because he had made a pledge to God that he would make a river of blood from the Persian army if he overran it. When he could not find enough people to make a river out of their blood after he defeated them, he killed the captives and opened a dam into their bleeding bodies. Isis uses the story to say this is the man described by the prophet as the Unleashed Sword of God and who was praised for his victory in that battle by the first Muslim caliph, Abu Bakr. When Isis kills its captives, a Muslim cleric can dismiss the act as un-Islamic, but Isis can

<p>(Khader 2015: 221-223)</p>	<p>simply cite the example of al-Walid. Because Isis bases its teachings on religious texts that mainstream Muslim clerics do not want to deal with head on, new recruits leave the camp feeling that they have stumbled on the true message of Islam.” (Hassan 2015)</p>
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SAMLET LITTERATUROVERSIGT

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